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This paper places embodiment in an evolutionary perspective and 
endeavors to show that as incipient speakers began forging a linguistic 
system, they molded their grammatical distinctions and syntactic functions 
on their perception of the outside world, but that in the course of evolution, 
these perceptually-tinkered features were gradually replaced with mental 
constructs, specifically conceived to serve linguistic purposes and serve 
them with increased potentiality and greater efficiency. The shift from 
perceptual to conceptual implements is perhaps most conspicuously visible 
in writing, where open-ended figurative hieroglyphs were replaced with a 
small set of abstract letters, but the process is pervasive. In syntax, the 
phenomenal notion of agency, so deeply anchored in our activities, and the 
entire grammatical system built thereupon were replaced with a model 
where agency is irrelevant and syntax is structured on the purely mental 
constructs of subject and object. The paper continues with further cases of 
disembodiment. 
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1. The Canonical View Questioned 
 
 For some fifty years the prevailing theory in mainstream linguistics was 
Chomsky’s nativist hypothesis. It stated that in the course of their evolution 
humans became endowed with an innate linguistic model that enabled them 
initially to build grammars and thereafter learn in their early years the language 
spoken in their linguistic environments. Since this innate model was postulated 
to have genetic correlates much like “an organ such as the eye or heart” 
(Chomsky 1980: 37), and since, barring a major mutation, these genetic correlates 
would permanently remain the same, all languages — extent or extinct — were 
by way of corollary ruled to be gratuitous variants of one another. This 
theoretical framework meant in turn that while languages do undergo changes, 
those changes are gratuitous: “There is no more reason” stated Postal 
emphatically, “for languages to change than there is for automobiles to add fins 
one year and remove them the next” (1968: 283). Languages, therefore, do not 
evolve; they remain with neutral changes the external manifestation of a 
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permanent innate model. 
 Initially, the nativist theory and its expression in formal language exerted 
an undeniable fascination, but more and more it became apparent that the 
necessary empirical support was lacking (cf. Vargha-Khadem et al. 1995: 930; see 
also Vargha-Khadem et al. 1998: 12699). Today,  with  counter  evidence  mounting,  
the  nativist  theory  is  openly  contested.  In  a  seminal  paper  published  in  a  journal  
that  once  hosted  Pinker  and  Bloom’s  comprehensive  presentation  of  the  nativist  
tenets,  Evans  and  Levinson  argued  that  
 
[t]he claims of Universal Grammar … are empirically false, unfalsifiable, or 
misleading in that they refer to tendencies rather than strict universals. 
Structural differences should instead be accepted for what they are, and 
integrated into a new approach to language and cognition that places 
diversity centre stage (2009:429).  
 
Speaking of a follow-up paper (Dunn et al. 2011) published by a partially 
different team, but from the same research center, the lead author told BBC 
online (Apr. 15, 2011): 
 
We show that each of these [four] language families evolves according to its 
own set of rules, not according to a universal set of rules. 
 That is inconsistent with the dominant ‘universality theories’ of 
grammar; it suggests rather that language is part of not a specialised module 
distinct from the rest of cognition, but more part of broad human cognitive 
skills. 
 
The cumulative message of the two papers, both based on a vast survey of 
languages, is clear and unmistakable: There is no linguistic evidence for the 
existence of a universal grammar coded in our genes, and languages pursue their 
own individual evolutionary courses. 
 The Dunn et al. paper is by no means flawless, and suggestions have been 
made to improve the approach (cf. e.g., Longobardi & Roberts 2011), but it does 
display a rigorous methodological approach applied, admittedly, to only one 
feature, namely the shift from head-last to head-first word order, but conducted 
across no less than one third of the world’s languages. Their conclusion is 
therefore well grounded: Languages evolve and they set their own evolutionary 
courses. Dunn and his colleagues’ innovative paper marks an important step in 
the study of linguistic change, but it begs the next one: If changes are discussed in 
an evolutionary framework, the discussion must then invariably include an 
assessment of the selective advantages of the output over the input. Such 
comparative assessments are indispensable if we are to understand why such 
sweeping changes have taken place and/or are ongoing, why they normally are 
irreversible, and why some applications of a broad shift may take exception (cf. 
e.g., the situation in English, where modifying adjectives are head last in a 
predominantly head first language). 
 The application of evolutionary criteria to the study of language has also 
been my pioneering activity for decades. Without a computational apparatus, but 
on the basis of diachronic data carefully placed in their historical context and 
Language: From Sensory Mapping to Cognitive Construct 
 
 
249 
properly extrapolated material from language typology, I have been arguing that, 
under normal circumstances, languages proceed in the direction of ever-higher 
efficiency, upgrading the power of expression of their implements while 
reducing their neuromuscular cost. Each language pursues such a course on its 
own — at its own rate and along its own pathway. Since no new alternative has 
only advantages, and no new alternative is the only one to present advantages, it 
is understandable that each language makes its own choices and takes its own 
pathway towards greater efficiency (cf. Bichakjian 2002 for an elaborate 
presentation).   
 
 
2. The Present Objective  
 
In this paper, I will argue that one of the important ways of achieving higher 
efficiency has been the shift from linguistic features initially molded on the 
sensory mapping of the external world to cognitive alternatives especially 
conceived to serve linguistic purposes. 
 This observable trend in the history of languages ties in with the adaptive 
nature of language, whose phylogenetic acquisition provided humans with a 
cognitive dimension that enables us to elaborate knowledge “not only from 
sensory mappings that we share with other anthropoids as well as most 
mammals, but by important inputs to the mapping that comes from our language 
‘sense’ as it has evolved in Homo sapiens” (Jerison 2001: 384). 
 The shift from perceptual to conceptual implements also ties in with the 
embodiment issue, and the observed linguistic process can be seen as a case of 
disembodiment. The units of measurement provide a clear illustration. The 
ancestral ones were generally based on the dimension of body parts — they were 
literally embodied: The inch was the standard width of the thumb, the foot the  
standard   length   of   the   eponymous organ; the Egyptian cubit represented the 
length of the forearm, and the yard that of the extended arm. With notable 
exceptions, these anthropomorphic units of measurement, molded on the 
perception of the outside world, have been replaced with the conceptually 
devised metric system, which has considerable selective advantages. The 
evolution of the units of measurement clearly illustrates the shift to and thence 
the evolutionary trend toward disembodiment, while the cases of resistance to 
the modern system reveal the clash and competition between visceral feelings 
and mental deliberation. In linguistics, the older quantitative and qualitative 
vowel alternations (cf. Lat. ĕdimus vs. ēdimus ‘we eat vs. we ate’ and Engl. we break 
vs. we broke anchored in our potential for rhythmicity would fall in the category 
of embodied features whereas the modern opposition based on mentally created 
auxiliaries would constitute a case of disembodiment. 
 
 
3. From a Perceptual Beginning  
 
Perhaps Athena burst forth from Jupiter’s forehead fully armed, but   that  
certainly  was  not  the  case  of  language,  and  the  idea  of  treating  language  as  an  all-­‐‑
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or-­‐‑none   entity   is   counterfactual.   Language developed in the course of time 
through the speakers’ unconscious, yet intuitively guided efforts. Linguists are 
unfortunately unable to reconstruct the utterances of incipient speakers, but they 
have access to sufficient data provided by internal reconstruction and typological 
surveys to trace the developmental trend. Incipient speakers started from scratch, 
but ex nihilo, nihil fit, from nothing, nothing comes. We all know that animals do 
not speak, but it is part of their survival strategy to observe and categorize the 
elements of the outside world and the activities taking place around them. So, 
when incipient speakers began cobbling a system of verbal communication, they 
brought to the task the knowledge and experience that were already theirs. Since 
that knowledge was essentially perceptual, the linguistic system that they first 
built was based on distinctions and functions molded on those observed in the 
outside world. These were gradually either abandoned when they proved 
unnecessary or replaced with mentally-constructed alternatives that provided 
greater efficiency.  
 The evolution of languages has therefore been a steady shift from 
perception- to conception-based grammatical distinctions and syntactic functions. 
This general trend can be observed in several important parts of language, but it 
is perhaps most conspicuous in the evolution of writing and the resulting 
development of the alphabet. It is true that the graphic representation of speech 
only plays an ancillary role, but its special illustrative value justifies its being 
included in the discussion before the focus is laid on the evolution of nouns, the 
development of adjectives, the realignment of arguments, the rise of temporal 
distinctions and the coining of marking devices. 
  
3.1. The Evolution of Writing: From Pictograms to Letters 
 
The evolution of writing is well known, and its course from perceptual 
pictograms to conceptual alphabetic letters is no secret. When they wanted to 
commit a word to a slab of stone, a clay tablet, or a papyrus scroll, scribes 
sketched the image of the referent, provided, of course, the referent was concrete. 
So, the outline of a snake, for example, represented the word snake, but also the 
words for items and attributes associated with snakes, such as venom and perfidy. 
As such, the pictograms functioned as ideograms — they were meant to be read 
as words, the word for the depicted item or those associated therewith. 
 But pictograms could also have a phonetic function, one with far reaching 
consequences for the history of writing. In the absence of the diacritic mark 
indicating that the image must be read semantically, pictograms could be read 
phonetically. An imaginary English example can illustrate the point. The word 
tail can easily be represented with the image of a tail, and when accompanied 
with the proper diacritic mark the pictogram will refer to the organ and its 
figurative and associative meanings. But without the diacritic mark, called 
determinative, the image simply refers to the sound of the word tail and as such 
could also be used to represent the less “photogenic” but like-sounding word tale. 
The pictogram for the word tail could also be combined in a rebus with the image 
of an oar to form the hieroglyph of the word tailor.  
 It is this phonetic use of pictograms that led to the development of 
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alphabetic letters. It occurred over time through a two-track process, one mental, 
the other graphic. Mentally, the initial consonant was extracted out of the 
continuous flow of speech sounds associated with the word and recognized as a 
specific entity, an entity without a semantic backing, but an entity, nevertheless. 
Graphically, the stylized and simplified form of the image of the full word 
became the sign of that abstract entity, the sign of a speech sound. It took more 
than two millennia for the Greek alphabet to evolve out of the Egyptian 
hieroglyphs. The process was admittedly slow, but writing systems did come up 
with conceptual alternatives for the initially created perceptual implements, and 
it was well worth the time and effort because an open-ended array of 700 
hieroglyphs was replaced with a set of less than fifty characters that can code for 
an infinite number of words and that can, barring accidental cases of 
homophony, do so unambiguously. Writing systems became fully accurate and 
considerably more efficient. It does require a formal learning process, but 
considering the yield, it is well worth the effort (for a less cursory presentation of 
the evolution of writing systems, cf. Bichakjian 2002: 221–258; see also the classic 
works of Diringer 1948 and Gaur 1984).  
 
3.2. Noun Classes  
 
Since we cannot reconstruct the utterances of incipient speakers, it is impossible 
to tell with certainty whether the first nouns were subcategorized in classes 
(human, animal, vegetal, solid, liquid, long, compact, etc.), but the existence of 
such grammatical distinctions in aboriginal languages, the survival of 
active/stative doublets such as the Germ. Wasser ‘water’, neuter, and the Fr. eau 
(< Lat. aqua) ‘water’, feminine and the fact that in the Indo-European languages 
neuter nouns are unmarked in the nominative suggest that the prototypical 
vernaculars probably subcategorized nouns according to the physical 
characteristics they attributed to their referents. The fact that the ancestral 
language had two words for ‘water’ — one neuter, i.e. inanimate, another 
feminine, i.e. animate — suggests that the ancestral speakers had a dual 
representation of ‘water’. In one perspective, they perceived ‘water’ as a material 
item and assigned it to the class of inanimate nouns, in the other as an entity 
endowed with cleansing virtues or calamitous powers and assigned it to the class 
of animate nouns. The absence of nominative markers of neuter nouns suggests 
that their etyma in an earlier language belonged to the class of nouns that could 
never appear in the agentive case — the forerunner of the nominative case — 
because their referents, like that of Germ. Wasser could never be the agent of an 
action (cf. inter alia Ashton et al. 1954 for an example of a language with noun 
classes, Meillet 1965: 219–220 on doublets, Diakonoff 1965: 55–56 for class 
evidence in Afro-Asiatic, and Schmidt 1979: 337 et seq. on neuter nouns).  
 The class distinction has not been completely eliminated everywhere; it 
often survives in the form of grammatical gender. The lineage is not complete 
and continuous, but one may reasonably surmise that incipient speakers built 
their grammar with distinctions observed and experienced in the outside world. 
But with speech making successive generations of speakers capable of greater 
abstraction, these perceptual markers proved to be redundant and thereby more 
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taxing than informative. Classes gave way to grammatical genders, which in turn 
were gradually reduced or eliminated altogether as in the case of English, but 
also Armenian, Bengali, Chinese, and many other languages. 
 
3.3.  The Adjectival Gap 
 
While the subcategorization of nouns in classes such as human, animal, vegetal, 
solid, liquid, long, compact, etc. was a likely feature of incipient speech, the 
distinction between active and inert or stative nouns was fundamental. Nouns, 
like their referents could be active or stative. In Latin the words for ‘hand’, ‘foot’, 
and ‘tongue’ were masculine or feminine, i.e. originally active since these are 
active organs, while the words ‘head’, ‘heart’, and ‘liver’ were neuter, i.e. 
originally stative since they were considered to be the seats, respectively, of 
intelligence, memory, and emotions. The active/stative distinction also applied to 
verbs: In Latin, ‘to kill’ was an active verb since it implies an activity on the part 
of the agent; ‘to die’ was a deponent since the experiencer is the seat of the action, 
not its author. So, originally, or at least in very ancient times, verbs were 
subcategorized into verbs of action and verbs of state, and since being white or 
red was a state, the characteristics that are expressed with adjectives in modern 
languages were expressed then with verbs of state (cf. Klimov 1979: 328 and 
fossilized tokens such as Lat. albeo ‘to be white’, rubeo ‘to be red’). It stands to 
reason that the incipient speakers’ first task was to label objects and coin words 
for actions and states. Conceptualizing quality and developing adjectives to 
express it came about later — the new part of speech needed greater mental 
application and higher abstraction.  
 
3.4. Argument Alignment from Agent/Patient to Subject/Object 
 
The subcategorization of nouns and verbs in active and stative classes is directly 
linked to how arguments were aligned in ancient times. The system was based on 
the incipient speakers’ observation of events in the outside world. When 
narrating the event of a hunter killing an antelope, hunter would be in the 
agentive case and so marked, while antelope would be in the “patientive” case 
and left unmarked. Since the “patientive” form is the unmarked or bare form of 
the noun, the “patientive” case has been called the “absolutive” case, while the 
agentive case has been dubbed “ergative” (< Gk. ergon ‘deed, action’). However, 
if an old man was there, his witnessing the scene of the hunting would be 
expressed with a stative verb, and old man would appear in the absolutive case, 
not in the ergative one, because a witness is not an agent. Both the old man and 
the antelope are considered to be part of the scene, not one of the movers — 
hence their being treated as patients and put in the absolutive case. 
 No exceptionally deep insight is needed to see that the incipient argument 
alignment was based on the perception and interpretation of events in the 
outside world. Since actions have agents and optionally one or more patients, 
their roles were carried over into grammar and made into syntactic functions. It 
should also be observed how important agency was considered to be. Not only 
dying, witnessing, and the like are not activities and the one involved does not 
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qualify as an agent, but the fact that it is the ergative form that carries a 
morphological marker indicates how important agency was — in real life and in 
grammar. 
 Gradually this perceptual model morphed into the conceptual one of the 
nominative languages, where the active/stative and agent/patient dichotomies 
borrowed from the outside world no longer play a role. The key players of the 
new model are subject and object, mentally constructed functions that make it 
possible for any noun to be the subject of any verb and for speakers to describe 
actions in all perspectives — the agent’s, the patient’s and even the beneficiary’s. 
Cf. 
 
(1) The hunter showed the antelope to the old man. 
 
(2) The antelope was shown by the hunter to the old man. 
 
(3) The old man was shown the antelope by the hunter. 
 
The shift from perceptual to conceptual grammatical functions has thus made 
grammar more flexible and more powerful. 
 
3.5.  Breaking the Bonds of the Present 
 
While the thoughts of incipient speakers no doubt wandered about the 
experiences they had had in the past or those they foresaw in the future, speaking 
always took place in the present, and, in the present, actions were either ongoing 
or completed or possibly resulting from previous actions (cf. Germ. wissen ‘to 
know’, akin to Lat. videō, meaning originally ‘to know for having seen’).Those 
were the ancient verbal distinctions — all of them in the present. They were not 
temporal, but aspectual, because initial speakers expressed what they beheld in 
the material world at the time they spoke. The three ancestral aspects were called 
present, aorist, and perfect in the traditional terminology; imperfective, perfective, 
and stative are the preferred labels today.  
 As languages evolved, aspectual distinctions did not disappear altogether. 
English, for instance, makes an aspectual distinction — aorist vs. perfect, or 
perfective vs. stative — between I ate and I have eaten. Likewise, but somewhat 
differently, French and the romance languages in general make a distinction 
between the perfective and imperfective aspects of the past tense as in j’ai mangé 
vs. je mangeais ‘I ate vs. I was eating’. Aspect is no doubt a useful distinction and 
that’s why it has been partially preserved, but one should not lose sight of the 
fact that as languages evolved aspectual systems as a whole have morphed into 
temporal systems (on the ancestry of the aspectual system and its shift to a 
temporal one, cf. inter alia Meillet 1928: xii and Kuryłowicz 1964: 130). Just as 
motion picture cameras provide a kaleidoscopic view of events, temporal systems 
enable speakers to travel through time, narrate events of a foregone past, and 
structure those of a yet-to-occur future. Developing such a verbal system 
required a mental effort, a far greater effort than witnessing that an action is 
ongoing or completed. 
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3.6. Grammatical Marking: From Modulation to Free Morphemes 
 
Let us imagine the following predicament of incipient speakers. They have 
coined nouns for objects and verbs for actions and states, but how are they going 
to make a distinction between an on-going action and one that is completed, one 
that is performed in one go and one that is performed repeatedly and in reduced 
form, or one performed normally and the same one with especial intensity. The 
original impulse seems to have been some form of stem modulation: Either the 
quality or the quantity of the root vowel was changed or the initial syllable was 
repeated — along with the change of quantity was at times a concomitant change 
of quality while stem reduplication often triggered a vowel reduction in the 
added syllable and occurred at times along with a vowel change in the stem (cf. 
e.g., Gk. dérkomai/dédorka I see/I have seen’, Lat. vĕnimus/vēnimus ‘we come/we 
came’, and facimus/fēcimus’ we make/we made’, pendimus/pependimus ‘we 
ponder/we pondered’, currimus/cecurrimus later by assimilation cucurrimus ‘we 
run/we ran’, and canimus/cecinimus ‘we sing/we sang’. Reduplication was also 
used elsewhere as in quisquis ‘whoever’ lit. ‘who-who’, quōquō ‘wherever’ lit. 
‘where-where’ and alter alterum ‘each other’ lit. ‘other of two-other of two’. 
Outside the Indo-European family, reduplication can also serve to express the 
intensive or iterative forms of verbs (cf. Arabic  kasara ‘he or she broke’ vs. kassara 
‘he or she smashed to bits’ and Swahili piga ‘to strike’ vs. pigapiga ‘to strike 
repeatedly’) or even the plural as in Malay rumah ‘house’ rumah-rumah ‘houses’. 
 While some cases of vowel alternation have survived, especially in the 
Germanic languages (cf. Engl. sing/sang/sung) and reduplication can occur today 
in baby talk and pet names (cf. Engl. itsy bitsy, Fr. Riri < Henri), stem modulation 
has generally been sidelined in the course of evolution and replaced with suffixes 
and infixes, which in turn have been partially replaced with particles and full-
fledged words serving grammatical functions. 
 Stem modulation is not a feature molded on occurrences taking place in the 
outside world, but there is something physical or even visceral and echolalic 
about alternations and reduplications. These are indeed embodied linguistic 
features. The first task of incipient speakers was understandably to label items 
and actions and states; they then bent and remodeled these contents words to 
form their paradigmatic variants. But with the use of language stimulating 
greater abstraction and increased use of mental power, over the years, speakers 
developed a broad range of specific morphological segments with grammatical 
functions as referents. The following step was having full-fledged grammatical 
words next to the first coined contents words. That was a major step in the 
conceptualization of grammatical implements. Function words are sometimes 
called “empty” words. The adjective empty contrasts with contents, but it also 
reveals the level of abstraction and the mental effort that is required to coin 
words that have “no” contents. The three steps can be observed in the following 
sequence from Early Latin to Modern French, where stem modulation is 
successively replaced first with suffixation, later with the use of an auxiliary. 
 
(4) cano/cecini > canto/cantavi > je chante/j’ai chanté 
 ‘I sing/I sung’ 
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 These evolutionary steps, which constitute a case of disembodiment, took 
place because each new alternative had selective advantages that the ancestral 
one did not have. Stem modulation has a certain charm, echolalic or cadential, 
but such processes can only provide a limited number of distinctions, while suf-
fixation offers unlimited possibilities. Suffixes are indeed open ended and as such 
more advantageous, but they have their own downside: They can trigger mor-
phological irregularities and thereby create language acquisition problems and 
delays (cf. Slobin, 1971: 347 on the difficulty of acquiring flectional systems). 
Function words have no quantitative restrictions; they are easy to acquire and 
powerful to operate. While the shift to mentally-generated grammatical markers 
and the corollary disembodiment were driven by the pursuit of greater efficiency, 
it should be born in mind that no feature is exclusively advantageous, nor exclu-
sively deleterious. Mentally generated linguistic implements have indeed the sel-
ective advantage of being more efficient, but embodied ones can also have theirs, 
such as the charm of reduplicatives in hypocoristics and nursery rhymes (e.g. The 
Incy Wincy Spider) and the more subtle pleasure of alliteration in adult language. 
 
 
4. The Evolving Instrument of a cerebral species 
 
It is a trivial observation that we humans do not have the tigers’ fangs, the 
antelopes’ speed, the eagles’ wings, or even the turtles’ shield or the elephants’ 
mass. We have none of the weapons and none of the defenses that other animals 
have, but we have a major trump card: We have, relative to our size, an 
exceptionally large and highly-developed brain (cf. mutatis mutandis Gould 1977: 
402). Brain power is our most valuable asset. We do not have fangs, but we have 
invented fire arms to hunt with; we cannot run as fast as antelopes, but we have 
engineered automobiles that transport us even faster; we cannot fly, but we have 
built aircrafts that make air travel not only possible, but fast and effortless.  
 Likewise, humans have started with rudimentary linguistic implements 
and developed ever-more efficient alternatives from agent-patient to subject-
object argument alignment, from verbs of state to adjectives, from stem 
modulation to suffixation and thence to an array of free grammatical morphemes 
such as pronouns, prepositions, auxiliaries, adverbs, and articles, and also from 
glottal and glottalized consonants, which involve an “intricate coordination of 
the actions of the larynx with the actions of the articulators in the mouth,” to 
simple oral consonants (Maddieson 2011).  
 Unlike all other species, humans are the only ones that have endeavored to 
find mentally generated and, as such, ever more efficient alternatives to the 
physical resources that are part of our endowments or immediately available in 
the outside world. The shift that was observed in language and also elsewhere 
from prototypes molded on the perception of objects and actions around us to 
mentally designed alternatives is therefore part of a truly human strategy. 
 It is our cerebral nature that explains the developments that were discussed 
in the foregoing, and they in turn support and confirm the view that language is 
not an instinct or a steady-state attribute coded in our genes, an organ as it was 
once claimed (Chomsky 1980: 37), but an instrument that keeps evolving — 
becoming ever more cerebral and, by so doing, ever more efficient. 
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Glossary of some of the technical terms used in this paper 
 
Argument alignment. The patterning of elements in a sentence. The nominative 
(also called accusative) alignment is that of the nearly universal model 
composed, independently of their order, of a verb, its subject, and optionally one 
or more objects. The much less common ergative alignment is a model based on 
the distinction between agent and patient, and active and stative verbs. 
Depending upon whether the action has an actual author or not, the verb will be 
active and combine with an agent in the ergative case and eventually a patient in 
the absolutive case, or stative and will combine simply with a patient in the 
absolutive case.  
 
Aorist. The traditional word for the perfective aspect, which denotes an action 
apprehended in its completion. Also used as a temporal distinction to denote a 
point action in the past without resultative connotations. Cf. e.g., I ate as opposed 
to I have eaten, which has resultative connotations meaning ‘I am full’, ‘I don’t 
have to eat’, etc. 
 
Aspect. Whereas temporal distinctions are about the relative time of the action, 
namely past, present, and future, as in I see, I saw, I shall see, aspectual distinctions 
apply to the flow of the action. The main aspects are imperfective, perfective, and 
perfect, as in I was eating, I ate, I have eaten. Pedagogical grammars all too often 
conflate tense and aspect, but seen properly, the distinction between I see and I 
saw is temporal, between I saw and I have seen is aspectual.  
 
Echolalia. Feature of two-syllable words where the second is much like the echo 
of the first. Cf. e.g., bye-bye, oink-oink, tic-tac. 
 
Embodied language. Items of language possibly shaped by aspects of the human 
body. 
 
Marker. A morphological device — often a suffix — used to indicate a paradig-
matic variant. In English, –s is the regular plural marker of nouns, while –ed is the 
past tense marker of regular English verbs. 
 
Marked/unmarked. These have two meanings:  
They may simply refer to the presence or absence of a marker. In English, plural 
nouns are marked, but plural adjectives are unmarked. 
In the theory of markedness, marked means a step or steps away from the basic 
or most natural variant. The vowel [ε] as in French mère ‘mother’ is unmarked — 
it is the most natural of all vowels — but the French vowel [œ], as in sœur ‘sister’, 
is marked for roundness because the spontaneous pronunciation of a front vowel 
is without lip rounding. The lip rounding is achieved through an extra effort—
hence the marking. The vowel [œ ̃], as in French brun ‘brown’, is doubly marked 
since it requires two extra efforts: One for lip rounding, one for nasalization. 
 
Universal Grammar is the set of the structural properties common to all natural 
languages claimed to be hard-wired into the human brain. 
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